Introduction
The efficient organization of public procurements is an important task both for developed countries (Klemperer 2002) and developing countries (Dlamini and Ambe 2012) , and constitutes part of their economic activity. This is connected with the fact that public procurements account for some 10-15 percent of GDP in the first group and approximately 20 percent in the second group (Lewis and Bajari 2011; Ohashi 2009 ).
The 2005 reform of the public procurement system, connected with the adoption of Federal Law 94-FL "On the Placement of Orders for Supply of Goods, Fulfillment of Works, Provision of Services for State and Municipal Needs", was aimed at preventing abuses by officials of government customer organizations and enhancing competition during the process of selecting suppliers. These objectives have been emphasized many times in statements by government representatives and reports of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (Artemyev 2006; RFAS 2012) . The tools used for attaining those objectives consisted of strict and detailed regulation of government order placement procedures with a focus on selecting suppliers on the basis of lowest price and restricting the use of any qualitative criteria for evaluating bids. Active introduction of the practice of selecting suppliers via auctions was also supposed to boost competition (due to limiting the use of requests for quotations and tenders).
All these measures stimulated the growth of competition in the sphere of public procurement, but at the same time an analysis of the practice of applying 94-FL demonstrated that they led to a shift of corruption to other stages of the procurement cycle (planning and delivery) and generated numerous problems in fulfilling contractual obligations (HSE policy paper 2010). Subsequent and more detailed empirical studies showed that the problems with executing contracts (delays in fulfilling obligations or failure to execute them in full volume) occur more frequently in cases when the legislation restricts customers to apply qualification and business reputation criteria in process of choosing suppliers (Yakovlev, Demidova, and Balaeva 2013) .
It should be noted, however, that this situation of excessively rigid regulation in the sphere of public procurement is not unique for Russia (Tadelis 2012) . A broad survey of public procurement effectiveness in countries of the European Union conducted in 2011 that covered 5,500 government customers and 1,800 suppliers from 30 countries showed that procurement procedures in the private sector are on the whole evaluated as more flexible and more efficient when compared to the public sector. At the same time, the level of competition at auctions is lower in the private sector (PwC 2011) . One of the factors of this competition decrease is the reputation of suppliers being taken into account. This creates a certain degree of inequality among the bidders, but at the same time it is conducive to better immediate procurement outcomes and creates long-term incentives for new potential suppliers to take part in tender procedures (Spagnolo 2012) . It should also be mentioned that the effectiveness of procurement procedures in the private sector does not lead to losses in quality during the execution of the contract, but allows it to remain at a comparative level with the public sector (Roodhooft and Abbeele 2006) .
Discussions concerning the consequences adopting 94-FL in Russia resulted in a critical revaluation of approaches to procurement regulation. Specifically, the concept of the Federal Contract System (FCS), a draft law that was submitted to the State Duma (parliament) in 2012, envisages the spread of regulation to the contract planning and implementation stages with a simultaneous widening of the spectrum of procurement procedures that can be used by government customers. Considering the experience of 94-FL enforcement, it is apparent that the creation of FCS will take more than one year. At the same time, new approaches to procurement regulation are in practice already being applied now (before FCS formation), in part within the framework of reforming budget sector organizations. 1 Such provisions were presumed to include procurement procedures and supplier selection mechanisms that take into account the specifics of a particular autonomous organization. Such implementation of "FCS elements" provides a good opportunity for comparing the consequences of applying old and new public procurement regulations, which constitutes the subject of this work.
Applying the difference-in-differences methodology (Ohashi 2009 ) and using the analytical approach proposed by (Yakovlev, Demidova, and Balaeva 2013) , this article analyzes the procurements of two budget sector universities during the period of 2011-2012. One of these organizations, which is a budget-sector institution, conducted its procedures in accordance with the provisions of 94-FL during the entire period under survey. The other organization, which is an autonomous organization, also conducted its procurements in accordance with 94-FL until
July 2011, but afterwards adopted and enforced its own procurement provision. The comparison of these two organizations enables us to assess the impact of the shift to new regulation forms on the main public procurement effectiveness parameters, including the level of competition at auctions, economizing by price decreases at auctions, and execution of contracts.
The material of the article is organized in the following way: Part 1 offers a brief description of both organizations under review and the main changes in procurement procedures of the autonomous organization as a result of adoption of its own procurement provision; Part 2 contains a descriptive analysis of procurement data in both organizations during the period of 2011-2012; Part 3 builds on this analysis to formulate the main hypotheses and methodology of econometric research; Part 4 presents the results of regression analysis; and in the conclusion we present the main findings and recommendations for economic policy.
The latter procurement method deserves special attention, as it accounts for a the starting price of a contract, then it shall present a relevant substantiation. On the one hand, this condition restricts price competition, but on the other hand it reduces the risk of concluding a contract with an incompetent supplier. Moreover, expert control over the substantiation of the starting prices by customer departments was introduced in some priority procurement areas (including construction jobs, computer hardware procurements, security and fire alarm equipment), contributing to significant cost-savings before the start of the auction.
Therefore, Organization No.1's adoption of its own procurement provision should presumably have an impact on both the competitiveness of procurement prices and on the quality of contract execution. These assumptions will be confirmed in the course of further analysis.
1 The List is compiled at the beginning of the year in three stages. First of all, suppliers with previous experience of fulfilling orders for this organization whose performance was satisfactory are included in the List. Stage two involves the placement of an electronic advertisement for any company interested in further participating in supplies under the simplified procedures and specializing in particular procurement areas to submit its reputation and qualification validation. At stage three, an additional invitation may be published for interested suppliers to participate in procedures for procurement areas with less than three contenders participating in the bids.
Inputs for Analysis and Comparison of the Main Procurement Parameters
The data set used for this analysis included the bulk of contracts concluded by both organizations in 2011-2012. This information was provided to us in the form of electronic tables by specialists in the procurement departments from both organizations, with the permission of their superiors. It should be mentioned at the same time that, as a result of the integration of the Ministry for Economic Development's database of orders and the register of government contracts formed by the Federal Treasury, all the data used by us became available at the portal www.zakupki.gov.ru.
The procurement information provided to us included the following initial data:  information on actual payments under the contract (time and amount).
In addition to the existing classification of goods, works, and services in the database, we also introduced another classification of procurements for purposes of further survey, based on provisions of the institutional economic theory. This classification includes "search goods", "experience goods", and "credence goods", and results from objective differences in quality evaluation opportunities.
1
In addition, as Organization No. 1 has adopted its own procurement provision, a relevant variable reflecting this event was entered in the database.
Taking into account the available empirical data characteristics, the effectiveness of procurement procedures for the considered public organizations can be estimated along such parameters as the share of orders (by the number of contracts and their value) placed through competition procedures, the competition at auctions, and the price decrease during the auction.
Contract execution issues can be measured on the basis of delays in fulfilling obligations (share of contracts with delays in execution and average duration of such delays).
To characterize the procurement activities of both organizations, it should be noted that and 2012 remained approximately at the same level and was slightly above 800 contracts annually for the former and 650 contracts annually for the latter organization (see Table 1 ). The average value of one contract in these organizations varied more substantially, totaling some 2.5 million rubles in Organization No.1 and 0.9 million rubles in Organization No.2. The values of these indicators practically did not change during the two years in question. The monthly dynamics of changes in the number of concluded contracts in both organizations is characterized with a strongly pronounced seasonal nature -the number of Table 2 ). In Organization No. 2, 61 percent of contracts concluded accounts for goods (89 percent of the procurement value), 6 percent for works (5 percent of the procurement value), and 33 percent for services (6 percent of the procurement value) (see Table 2 ). The largest share of procurements both in terms of quantity and in terms of value for both organizations falls within the broad category of experience goods, and the smallest category in terms of value is search goods for Organization No. 1, and credence goods for Organization No. Further analysis was conducted with account for Organization No. 1's implementing its own procurement provision in July 2011. The database for this organization is divided accordingly into two parts: before and after July 2011. A descriptive analysis is also made separately for each of these two periods. As Organization No. 2 remained a budget organization during 2011-2012 and its procurements were carried out in accordance with 94-FL, analysis of this organization will be conducted simultaneously for the whole sample.
(
The situation with delayed contracts undoubtedly underwent better changes in The situation with delays in Organization No. 2 was rather stable during the entire period accounted for a mere 2 percent of the total value of all contracts concluded in the period from July 2011 to December 2012 (Table 4) . Another procurement procedure spread widely after Organization No.1 enforced its own procurement provision is single-source contracting. These procurements accounted for 26 percent of contracts and 49 percent of the overall value.
Procurements of a sufficiently high value are also often made through open auctions, accounting for 15 percent of the total quantity of procurements and 30 percent of the overall value. After Organization No.1 adopted its own procurement provision the situation with delays significantly improved -the maximum share of delayed contracts did not exceed 11 percent for contracts concluded through electronic auctions (Table 5) . At the same time, the competitiveness of the procedures dropped to an average of 1.5-1.9 bidders. The amount of economizing due to price decreases at tenders also diminished; the share of procedures where price decreases were registered went down insignificantly in cases of requests for quotations (from 88 percent to 80 percent) and, on the contrary, increased in cases of electronic auctions (from 61 percent to 69 percent). The most significant price decreases (over 30 percent) were registered in cases of electronic auctions for Organization No.1 (94-FL) (24 percent of contracts were concluded by this method) and in cases of requesting quotations for Organization No.2 (9 percent of contracts) (Tables 6 and 8) . Following the transfer of Organization No.1 to its own procurement provision the scope of price decrease became much less significant, and the price of the contract over all procedures began to decrease, as a rule, by not more than 5 percent of the starting price (Table   7) . 
Main Hypotheses and Methodology of Empirical Study
An analysis of changes in the autonomous institution's procurement procedures as compared to 94-FL and a comparison of the main procurement parameters of the two public institutions under survey leads to the formulation of the following hypotheses:
1) The autonomous institution's procurement provision introduces new procedures for selecting suppliers on the basis of business reputation criteria (e.g., a
"simplified procedure", with the placement of orders among suppliers formerly successful in meeting their obligations under contracts with this public institution). We therefore assume that transferring to the institution's own procurement provision would lead to a relative decrease in competition at auction. This means that the number of auction participants in competitive procedures at Organization No.1 will drop after the adoption of its own procurement provision.
2)
To prevent "dumping" the autonomous institution's procurement provision introduces requirements for the supplier to provide additional substantiation of its capability to execute the order with adequate quality in the event of a more than 25-percent price decrease as compared to the starting price. Therefore, we assume that after Organization No.1 transfers to its own procurement provision the price at the auction will decrease less significantly. In some procurement areas this may also be a consequence of expert control of the substantiation of starting prices by customer departments envisaged by the in-house regulations of Organization No.1.
3)
A wider use of qualification and business reputation criteria by Organization No.1 after the transfer to its own procurement provision should stimulate the lowering of default risks under the concluded contracts. Therefore, we assume that after Organization No.1 transfers to its own procurement provision the average period of delays in fulfillment of obligations will decrease, as well as the share of contracts where such delays occurred.
We will test the formulated hypotheses on the basis of previously proposed and piloted methodological approaches to analyzing auction price decreases and overall procurement effectiveness, as well as contract execution problems (Yakovlev, Demidova, and Balaeva 2013; PwC 2011) . Our regression models will use the following dependent variables:
 the number of bidders participating in competitive procurement procedures;  contractual price decreases as a result of auctions (% of starting price);  period of delays in contract execution (days).
Using relevant control variables, we included in our models the procurement method (quotations, auctions, tenders, simplified procedures, and single-source contracting), the type of procured goods based on the "works/goods/services" and Nelson-Darby-Karni classifications, the procurement budget (or the contract value for hypothesis 3), the contract period, order placement quarter, and the quarter of its delivery. The regressor for the number of bidders will be added to models characterizing the factors of auction price decreases, and the regressor for auction price decreases under relevant contracts will be added to the models that analyze delays in contract execution. In the latter model, in cases of single-source contracting, the auction price decrease is accepted as zero. As all dependent variables are continuous, the analysis will use linear regression models evaluated by the least-squares method. To address the problem of heteroscadecticity of disturbances in the estimated models, we used White estimators for standard deviations (as more robust but consistent ones). As the budget of the bid (contract value)
is included as an independent factor in all models under review and its value is by several orders of magnitude greater than the value of dependent variables, the hypothesis concerning the inclusion of this factor in logarithmic form was accepted on the basis of the Box-Cox test. As already mentioned above, Organization No.2 used tenders quite seldom. In order to avoid inconsistent estimates of coefficients before a relevant factor, these observations were excluded from all models. A full list of variables used in the regression analysis and their descriptive statistics are presented in Tables P1 and P2 in the Appendix.
The effect of Organization No.1 adopting its own procurement provision will be estimated on the basis of the difference-in-differences methodology (Ohashi 2009 ). The main points of the difference-in-differences methodology are as follows. Two similar objects (in our case, Organization No.1 and Organization No.2) and two periods of time (in our case, before and after Organization No.1 adopted its own procurement provision, with both objects operating in identical conditions in the first time period) are selected. In the second period of time, the first object was subjected to certain treatment, and the second object was not. If we are interested in the change of some parameter for the first object in the second period of time as compared to the first period, the difference can be connected both with the treatment effect and with a change in external conditions not related to the specified treatment. The survey of the second object is aimed precisely at helping us understand whether there has been a change in external conditions, and, if there has been, to estimate this change. Assessment of the treatment effect for the first object by the difference-in-differences method consists of the following: comparing the values that characterize the changes in the second period as compared to the first one in the parameter of interest for the first and second objects, and their difference, yields the treatment effect for the first object (the change effect isolated from external conditions).
Results of Regression Analysis
The results of estimation models characterizing the level of tender competition are presented in Tables 9 and 10. To estimate the treatment effect, a dummy variable was included in all models -the indicator of effect for Organization No.1's own procurement provision (the second half of 2011
and the whole year of 2012; we additionally will check whether it is possible to equate the three half-year periods comprising the corresponding time intervals).
According to the presented data, Organization No.1's adoption of its own procurement provision led to a decrease in the number of bidders -the relevant coefficient in models 3 and 4 is negative and is significant the 1% level. At the same time, the dummy variable reflecting
Organization No. 1's introduction of its own procurement provision is insignificant for Organization No.2. These results confirm hypothesis 1 formulated above. The levels of R 2 in the estimation results are quite low. It can be dealt with heterogeneity of procurements.
Unfortunately, data constraints do not enable us to estimate the same models for any single procurement good. In order to control the types of procurements, we use different classifications, but regardless it does not cover all varieties and specifics of goods. An analysis of price decreases for competitive procedures shows that the introduction by Organization No.1 of its own procurement provision did not impact the decrease of auction prices (models 11 and 12 in Table 11 ). The coefficient of the dummy variable reflecting the Organization No.1's adoption of its own procurement provision in similar models calculated for Organization No.2 (see Table 12 ) is also insignificant. These findings partially agree with hypothesis 2. *, **, *** -the coefficient is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, or 1 percent, respectively
The analysis of delays in public procurement contracts shows that Organization No.1's enforcement of its own procurement provision resulted in a decrease in delays by 7 days on average (see Table 13 ). At the same time, the effect of enforcement by Organization No.1 of its own procurement provision in models for Organization No.2 is insignificant. Therefore, the results of regression analysis for both organizations do not contradict hypothesis 3. The problem of a low R 2 level in the models can be due to specifics of procurement goods, as well as contract specifics. The latter may include prepayments, financial provisions, and other guaranteeing requirements for the supplier, which we do not control for here. 
Conclusion
The authors of this work, relying on a large empirical dataset for two large state universities, estimate the effect of introducing new approaches to regulating public procurements, which are to be developed in full measure in the process of creating the Federal Contract System.
Specifically, we tried to find out to what degree extending opportunities of government customers during the transfer from the status of a budget institution to the status of an autonomous organization impacts the level of tender competition and price decrease during the placement of orders the fulfillment of obligations under the concluded contracts. Basing our study on an analysis of provisions of 94-FL and the procurement provision of the considered autonomous organization, we assumed that extending the spectrum of used procurement procedures and the possibility of using additional qualification and business reputation criteria would lead to a decrease in competition and lesser price reductions, but also to a better execution of obligations.
To test the formulated hypotheses, we employed difference-in-differences methodology by comparing the effect for the autonomous organization, which introduced considerable changes to its procurement regulations, and for the budget institution, which conducted its procurements on the basis of 94-FL. It should be noted that substantial differences in these organizations' procurement structures constituted an objective restriction for our analysis, despite the comparability of their volumes. Nevertheless, these differences have no impact on the significance of the findings.
The findings partially substantiated our hypotheses. Specifically, we revealed that the enforcement of the autonomous institution's own procurement provision resulted in a decrease of the number of bidders and in much less delays of contract execution. At the same time, zero effect was registered at the budget institution considered as the benchmark. Moreover, as far as price reduction analysis is concerned, no significant effect of the enforcement of the autonomous institution's own procurement provision was registered in either of the two organizations.
It is clear that our findings need additional verification based on a wider sample of data that includes more than two organizations, as well as employing non-parametric econometrics to cover the non-linearity of some factors. Nevertheless, we can state that the offered approach enables us to make a quantitative measurement of the effects of introducing new procurement regulation mechanisms. Therefore, this approach can be applied in practice by regulatory authorities, principal administrators of budget funds, and major organizations who are government customers for analyzing the results of piloting the introduction of individual FCS elements. a) The variable is categorical. In the estimated models, these variables were replaced by a set of dummy variables. For example, the "method of procurement" variable was replaced with the variables "auctions" (a value of 1 was given if there was an auction during the order placement and 0 if otherwise), "tenders" (a value of 1 was given if there was a tender during the order placement and 0 if otherwise). Quotations were used as the reference category. a) The variable is categorical. In the estimated models, these variables were replaced by a set of dummy variables. For example, the "method of procurement" variable was replaced with the variables "auctions" (a value of 1 was given if there was an auction during the order placement and 0 if otherwise), "tenders" (a value of 1 was given if there was a tender during the order placement and 0 if otherwise). Quotations were used as the reference category.
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